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THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE S
RELIMINARY DETERMINATION IN THE LESSTHAN-FAIR-VALUE INVESTIGATION OF
100- TO 150-SEAT LARGE CIVIL AIRCRAFT
FROM CANADA :
THE USE OF ADVERSE INFERENCE IN
ANTIDUMPING INVESTIGATIONS AND PRELIMINARY
DETERMINATIONS
Aerial Gill*
INTRODUCTION
The Tariff Act of 1930, now codified as 19 U.S.C. Chapter 4, and
also known historically as the Hawleyleg
involving U.S. industries and to provide and administer trade
remedies.1 The Department and the Commission jointly administer

*
Candidate for Juris Doctor & International Masters of Business
Administration 2018, University of South Carolina School of Law, Darla
Moore School of Business.
1
See Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 4, (1930); Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Handbook, U.S., USITC Pub. 4540, (Jun. 2015). See also
Understanding Antidumping & Countervailing Duty Investigations, U.S.,
USITC, https://www.usitc.gov/press_room/usad.htm (last visited Mar. 27,
2018).
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antidumping2 and countervailing duty3 laws codified under the Act,
with each possessing different responsibilities as to the administration
of these laws.4
Under the Act, interested parties 5 may file an antidumping or
countervailing duty petition with the Department and the Commission
alleging that a U.S. industry is either materially injured or threatened
with material injury from imports sold in the U.S. at less-than-fair6
If the Department makes a finding that a foreign
product or merchandise sold in the U.S. at LTFV and is, or is likely to

2

19 U.S.C. § 1677(34) (1930)
likely sale of goods at less than fair value. In more specific terms, dumping is
defined as selling of a product in the U.S. at a price that is lower than the price
for which it is sold in the home market. Antidumping is the administration of
duties (taxes) or laws that combat and discourage dumping activities);
Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Handbook, USITC Pub. 4540 at A-4,
U.S. (Jun. 2015).
3
Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Handbook, USITC Pub.
4540 at A-3, U.S. (Jun. 2015) (defining
on an imported good to offset subsidies to producers or exporters of that good
in the exporting country).
4
See Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Handbook, U.S.USITC
Pub. 4540 (Jun. 2015).
5

manufacturer, producer, or exporter, the government of a country in which the
merchandise in question is produced or manufactured, a certified union which
is representative of an industry engaged in the manufacture or production of
the merchandise in question, a trade or business association a majority of
whose members manufacture or produce the merchandise in question). See
also Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Handbook, USITC Pub. 4540 at
A-5, U.S. (Jun. 2015).
6
THE FINANCIAL D ICTIONARY, The Free Dictionary, https://financialdictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Less+Than+Fair+Value (
-than-fairsignificantly less expensive than a domestically produced good. A less-thanfair-value sale is not simply less expensive, but is determined to be anticompetitive. Selling products at less than fair value is synonymous with
dumping).
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be, injurious to a U.S. industry, then the Department may impose an
antidumping duty on that product or merchandise. 7
This article will discuss and evaluate a recent Department
preliminary determination, finding that a Canadian civil aircraft
manufacturer was selling its products in the U.S. at LTFV over a
period of twelve months. 8
ultimate preliminary determination, it used adverse facts available
information for its LTFV determination. 9 Under the Act, the
Department has the option to use facts otherwise available, or an
adverse inference, when the Department finds that an interested party
has failed to comply with a request for information. 10 In this case, the
Department found the Canadian aircraft manufacturer, an interested
party, failed to cooperate with the investigation by not complying with
a request for information, despite multiple opportunities to do so. 11
Consequently, the Department was permitted to use, at its discretion,
an adverse inference in its determination of a preliminary estimatedweighted-average dumping margin to be applied to the Canadian
products under consideration. 12
Part I of this article will provide background information on the
Tariff Act of 1930 and its current role as the authority on antidumping
and countervailing duty investigation proceedings conducted by the
U.S. Department of Commerce and other U.S. based trade bodies
today. More specifically, this part will explain the procedural use of

7

19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1930).
See Decision Memorandum for the Preliminary Determination in the
Less-Than-Fair-Value Investigation of 100- to 150-Seat Large Civil Aircraft
from Canada from the Office of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty
erce to Carole Showers,
Exec. Director, Office of Policy (Oct. 4th, 2017).
9
Id.
10
See 19 U.S.C. § 1677e (1930).
11
supra note 8 at II.
12
Id.
8
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Department of Commerce and what qualifies for its usage.
Part II will lay out the facts of the case at issue, specifically the
Preliminary Determination in the Less-Than-Fair-Value Investigation
of 100- to 150-Seat Large Civil Aircraft from Canada. Part III will
analyze and discuss the contents of the case, focusing on the
preliminary determination and its correlating estimated-weightedaverage dumping margin.
Part IV will discuss the controversial implications and practical
effects of adverse inference in practice today. Part V will conclude by
summarizing the key findings and highlights of adverse inference as it
was used in both the case discussed here and in daily practice.

I.

BACKGROUND

with trade protectionist policies under the Hoover Administration
during the Great Depression. 13 The Act was intended to protect
American jobs and businesses, particularly in the agricultural sector,
from imports by placing duties on imported goods. 14 After several
additions and amendments to the statute over the last eighty-plus years,
the Act today serves as an authority on trade and customs and is used
by the Department and the Commission to administer laws, investigate
trade violations, and provide trade remedies. 15
Until 1979, the U.S. Department of the Treasury was responsible
for administering antidumping laws under the Antidumping Act of

13

See generally Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Handbook,
USITC Pub. 4540 at IV-3, (June 2015).
14
Id.
15
Id.
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1921.16

The Trade Agreements Act, 17 with roots in the General
18
repealed the Act of 1921,
making significant substantive and procedural changes to antidumping
laws that were added to the Tariff Act of 1930 and ultimately shifted
the responsibility of antidumping administration from the Department
of the Treasury to the Department of Commerce. 19
Today, the Act permits the use of a controversial tool that is
adverse inference.20 Under U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty
laws, AFA (or adverse inference)
if an interested party in an investigation fails to comply with
information requests in trade proceedings. 21 Non-cooperative parties
are not a new challenge in international trade investigations as
information since the inception of the trade laws, and the agencies have

16

Id. at IV-4.
See id., (The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 governs trade
agreements negotiated between the U.S. and other countries; it implemented
GATT antidumping codes into American antidumping laws under the Tariff
Act of 1930 and repealed the Antidumping of 1921.).
18
International Trade Commission, supra note 13, at IV-3; see The
GATT Years: From Havana to Marrakesh, World Trade Organization, (The
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade or the GATT was established after
WWII in conjunction with the failed attempt to create the International Trade
Organization (ITO), which would eventually be replaced by the World Trade
Organization (WTO), to develop and establish strong rules for a prosperous
multilateral trading system. The GATT was eventually replaced by the WTO
in 1994, but Article VI of the GATT on antidumping serves as a model for
antidumping laws worldwide.).
19
International Trade Commission, supra note 13, at IV-3.
20
Joshua E. Kurland, Emerging Trends in the Court of International
, 46 GEO. J. INT L LAW 81, 115
(2014).
21
See 19 U.S.C. § 1677e (1930).
17
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The
option to use adverse inference was added to the Act through the
cooperation of interested parties and deterring non-compliance.23 The
Department is permitted to draw facts that are adverse to the noncooperating party in its determination of a dumping margin rate so that
the non-cooperating party does not receive a favorable outcome (i.e. is
not rewarded) when it fails to c
for information that are pertinent to the investigation. 24
Under the Act, anytime the Department resorts to adverse
inference and consequently draws on secondary information, 25 as
opposed to information that is attained through a trade investigation,
26

This
essentially requires the Department to ensure that the secondary
information being used is reasonably reliable and relevant.27

22

Kathleen W. Cannon & Benjamin Blase Caryl, 18th Judicial
Conference of the United States Court of International Trade: Salvaging
Court, Agency, and Private Litigant Resources When Faced With
Noncooperative Parties, 23 TUL. J. INT L & COMP. L. 301, 302 (2015).
23
See id. at 305 (The Uruguay Round Agreement or URAA was an act
enacted by U.S. in 1994 that implemented the Marrakesh Agreement into U.S.
law.).
24
Id. at 304.
25
See
supra note 8
Information is defined as information derived from the petition that gave rise
to the investigation or review, the final determination concerning the subject
merchandise, or any previous review under Section 751 of the Act concerning
26
27

Id.
Id.
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II. FACTS

28

The Department initiated an investigation into these allegations on
May 17, 2017.29
issued the AD Questionnaire30
parties about their opportunity to comment on the physical
characteristics (i.e. the scope) of the merchandise under
consideration.31 On June 19, 2017, the parties submitted their
comments to the Department regarding the physical characteristics of
the merchandise, and the Department incorporated them into the
investigation at their discretion. 32 While Bombardier submitted
commentary regarding the physical characteristics of the merchandise
described in the petition, Bombardier never submitted the required AD
Questionnaire issued by the Department on June 9. 33
On October 4, 2017, the Department announced its preliminary
finding: Bombardier imported and sold its merchandise in the U.S. at
LTFV and determined a dumping margin rate of 79.82% for these
products.34
Because Bombardier did not comply with the
ent resorted to
adverse facts in its preliminary LTFV determination and subsequent
preliminary estimated weighted average dumping margin. 35 The
specifically

28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

Id. at 1.
Id.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2, 5.
Id. at 1, 7.
Id. at 5.
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choosing not to calculate a rate for the
-examined
36
Rather, the Department chose the
only rate or dumping margin mentioned in the investigation. 37 The
Department sufficiently validated the petition, thereby fulfilling the
statutory requirements for drawing an adverse inference to make a
preliminary determination. 38

III. CASE ANALYSIS
A. ANALYSIS OF THE DEPARTMENT

S USE OF ADVERSE INFERENCE

In its LTFV investigation, the Department determined that

interests in determining a weighted-average dumping margin for their
products.39 The Act provides the guidelines for utilizing secondary
facts.40
by the Department; (B) fails to provide such information by the
deadlines for submission of the information; (C) significantly impedes
a proceeding; or (D) provides such information but the information
in reaching the applicable determination.41
The Act also goes on to say that the Department must consider the
ability or fitness of the interested party to provide the requested
information, provided the interested party promptly gives notification
he information requested in the

36
37
38
39
40

Id. at 7.
Id.
supra note 8, at 9.
Id. at 6.
19 U.S.C. § 1673, supra note 7, at 776(a)(1); 776(a)(2)(A)-(D)

(1930).
41

19 U.S.C. § 1677e (1930).
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requested form and manner, together with a full explanation and
suggested alternate forms in which such party is able to submit the
42
This consideration provision also relies upon the
assumption that the interested party completely submits the
information by the deadline. 43
In this case, the Department had provided Bombardier with
numerous opportunities to comply with their information request.
After not receiving the requested information by the deadline along
with no notification or explanation for why the party was unable to
provide the requested information, the Department preliminarily
determined that Bombardier withheld the requested information, failed
to provide the requested information by the specified deadline, and
significantly impeded the proceeding. Thus, the Department was able
preliminary estimated weighted-average dumping margin in the LTFV
investigation.44
According to the Act, the Department is free to employ an adverse
from the LTFV investigation, a previous administrative review, or any
45
In using an adverse
inference to select a rate, as is the case here, the Department selects a
does not obtain a more favorable result by failing to cooperate than if
46
In practice,
of: (1) the highest dumping margin alleged in the petition, or (2) the
47
Here,

42
43
44
45
46
47

19 U.S.C. § 1677m(c)(1) (1930).
Id. at (e)(1).
See U.S.
supra note 8, at 5.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id.; See also 19 U.S.C. § 1677e, supra note 10, at (d)(2).
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the Department opted to use the only dumping margin that Boeing, the
petitioner, alleged in its petition 79.82%. 48

B. ANALYSIS OF

S AFA CORROBORATION

After drawing the dumping margin from secondary information
49

ability and relevance
To satisfy the reliability requirement,

value among other key elements of the margin calculation; 50 the
Department found the evidence to have probative value and to be
reliable.51
Under the statute, the Department was also required to determine
the relevance of the secondary information used to draw the adverse
inference. 52
required to estimate what the dumping margin would have been if the
interested party faili
nor is it required
eged
53
The Department
is

derived

from

information

about

prices

and

accounting

54

The Department was therefore able to preliminarily determine that
the dumping margin alleged by Boeing in the petition was acceptable

48
49
50
51
52
53
54

supra note 8, at 7.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 9.

2017
THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE S RELIMINARY
259
DETERMINATION IN THE LESS-THAN-FAIR -VALUE INVESTIGATION OF
100- TO 150-SEAT L ARGE C IVIL AIRCRAFT FROM CANADA

under the statute because the Department had corroborated the alleged
rate to the extent practicable by demonstrating that the rate was both
reliable and relevant.55

IV. DISCUSSION
A. EFFICIENCY/RESOURCE ALLOCATION RATIONALE
One of the primary rationales behind the use of adverse inference
is to promote efficiency and preserve Department resources. 56 While
the statute requires the Department to provide parties to the
investigation with sufficient time to amend or edit responses that are
incomplete or inadequate, the statute does not articulate the number of
opportunities the Department is required to give parties to respond to
requests for information.57 In many antidumping and countervailing
duty cases, it is not uncommon for the Department to have to send
information requests to foreign producers multiple times and
afterwards to have to go through a series of back-and-forth responses
with the producer because their responses are insufficient, incomplete,
or altogether incorrect.58 These insufficient responses to information
are often strategically withholding and not only waste Department
resources, but also impede Department proceedings.59
One criticism: when a non-cooperating foreign producer fails to
submit required information to the Department during an
investigation, that producer often ends up expending resources arguing

55
56
57
58
59

Id.
See Cannon & Caryl, supra note 22, at 302.
Id. at 309.
Id.
Id.
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against the use of or final determination from the AFA rate that should
have been devoted to supplying the requested information. 60

B. IS ADVERSE INFERENCE TOO HARSH?
The adverse inference option has been criticized for being too
intentionally punitive or harsh.61 Section 776(b) of the Act specifically
states that when the Department sets about determining a rate that is
based on adverse facts available, the Department should select a rate
that is sufficiently adverse to ensure that the uncooperative party does
not obtain a more favorable result by failing to cooperate than if it had
fully cooperated. 62
Though often the non-cooperating respondent in an investigation
fails to provide any of the information requested by the Department,
the AFA can be applied in cases where the respondent merely fails to
provide all of the requested information or provides the incorrect
information, even by mistake which makes the usage of the AFA
option seem somewhat severe and contributes to its surrounding
controversy in courts today. 63 This is exemplified in Mukand, Ltd. v.
United States, which stems from an administrative review of the
cases.64 In Mukand
to use AFA was proper because the respondent, an Indian company
that exports stainless steel into the U.S., had failed to sufficiently

60

Id. at 307.
See generally id. at 310.
62
See 19 U.S.C. 776(b); Id. at 305.
63
See generally, Mukand, Ltd. v. United States, 767 F. 3d. 1300
(demonstrating that partial, mistaken, and other forms of noncooperation are
equally as liable to AFA treatment in antidumping cases as full noncooperation
is).
64
Id.
61
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production costs.65 In Mukand, the Indian company responded to
every information request initiated by the Department, including
requests that asked for supplemental or explanatory information. 66
Mukand intended to thwart [the Department] in its efforts to complete
operate to the best of its
67
The Court went on to
responses known repeatedly and explained to Mukand both the
rationale for their request and what it would be used for, concluding
68

As demonstrated by the example above, there is no bad faith
requirement in the statute, nor is there a good faith exception. 69 There

70

This means that even if a respondent timely responds to
every request for information (including requests for additional and
supplemental information) and supplies all information it believes
required in good faith, the Department may still choose to resort to an
adverse inference as it would in a case where the respondent never
responds to any request for information. This anomaly leads to the
inevitable and questionable outcome where a fully cooperative party
receives the same negative result as a non-cooperative party. This
inconsistency points out a marked and inherent degree of unfairness in
the statute, begging the question of whether the Department should

65

Id. at 1302.
Id. at 1303-04.
67
See Kurland, supra note 20 (quoting Mukand, 767 F.3d. at 1304).
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(e)(b)(1); see also Jennifer S. Huber and Simon
G. Courtman, 2014 International Trade Law Decisions of the Federal Circuit,
64 AM. U. L. REV. 899, 939 (2015).
66
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distinguish the non-cooperative parties from cooperative parties in its
AFA treatment and subsequent dumping margin determination.
Currently, there is nothing in the statute to suggest that AFA treatment
and rate determination for parties subject to an investigation should
differentiate between cooperating and non-cooperating parties.

C. TOO MUCH DEPARTMENT DISCRETION
Another criticism contributing to the controversial nature of the
use of adverse inference in investigations is that the Department has
too much discretion in its determination of applicable dumping margin
rates in cases involving non-cooperating foreign producers and that
such rates have been too high. 71 Indeed, the Federal Circuit has
appears to be particularly great, allowing [the Department] to select
among an enumeration of secondary sources as a basis for its adverse
72
In anti-dumping cases involving a noncooperating foreign party, if the Department invokes an adverse
inference to determine a dumping margin, they are free to select from
any of the secondary information submitted during the proceeding,
including the petition containing the allegations against that foreign
party.
Alternatively, courts have determined that the application of an
AFA rate cannot be punitive and have elaborated that a rate drawn
73
from adverse inference
Responding to
fears and criticisms of potentially punitive behavior, courts have
remanded the Department on several occasions when the AFA rate in
investigations exceeds 100%. 74 This was seen in a recent case
involving a Chinese
AFA rate determination of 216.01% was found unreasonable by the

71
72
73
74

Cannon and Caryl, supra note 22, at 309-10.
Id. at 310.
Id.
Id.
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U.S. Court of International Trade. 75 The court in this case expounded
cooperating respondents, [the Department] must provide a clearer
explanation for its choice and ample record support for its
76
In this particular case, the Department ultimately
was remanded three times for determining an AFA rate for a noncooperating foreign party that was too high. 77
In keeping with the resource allocation and efficiency criticisms,
time-consuming remands, such as these, 78 have been criticized for
encouraging foreign parties involved in such investigations to
withhold information during the investigation and instead use their
resources to argue against the final margin determination, alleging that
it is punitive in nature. 79 The most blatantly non-cooperative foreign
parties, even ones who submit fraudulent information to the
Department, will impose litigation to argue over what the rate should
be, often appealing several times, taking the issue to the Court of
International Trade. 80 The issues of why the party simply did not
submit the requested information accurately and timely in the first
place often get lost in the litigation. 81 This negative incentive to
litigate is not only a waste of Court and Department resources but is
also time-consuming and counter to the purpose of the Department to
administer trade investigations and remedies efficiently. These types
of resource-wasting scenarios give rise to the practical and ethical
questions of whether foreign parties who blatantly refuse to cooperate
with government agencies or worse, knowingly submit false
information to the government, should be permitted to take their
claims to court. Further, should the number of resources potentially

75
76
77
78
79
80
81

Id.
See id.; see also, Lifestyle Enterprise v. United States, 768 F.Supp.
See generally, id.
Cannon and Caryl, supra note 22.
Id. at 310.
Id. at 303.
Id.
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wasted in such cases be taken into consideration at all when these cases
arise?

V. CONCLUSION
While the Department of Commerce plays an important role in
protecting American industry from foreign competitors dumping
goods into the U.S. at LTFV, the ruling body of laws that govern antiwithout controversy and criticism. The Tariff Act of 1930 provides
the Department with broad discretion and power for dealing with noncooperating foreign parties in its investigations into anti-dumping
cases with the goal of efficiently and expeditiously resolving these
issues, saving valuable resources and time. However, these goals are
often frustrated in modern practice and the applicable laws that are
intended to promote efficiency and expediency in dealing with such
parties sometimes have the opposite desired effect: encouraging
unnecessary and excessive litigation, wasting Department resources,
and inadvertently treating cooperating parties in the same punitive
manner as non-cooperating parties. Nevertheless, as seen in the
-ThanFair-Value Investigation of 100- to 150-Seat Large Civil Aircraft from
Canada and application of adverse inference to determine the
applicable anti-dumping margin rate, this tool is still very much in use
and continues to reinforce the message that non-cooperating foreign
parties in anti-dumping investigations will not go unpunished.

